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Introduction
Both redistribution and growththe chosen
themes of this issue of the IDS Bulletinare
subordinate in the Chinese view of economic
development to the broader goal of building and
consolidating a socialist society. It is not that the
Chinese are in any sense 'anti-growth' (despite
idealistic interpretations to this effect among some
Western admirers of the still predominantly
rural Chinese 'way of life'). On the contrary,
China's commitment to the construction of a
modernized and fully comprehensive economy is
explicit though long-term, and recent substantial
purchases of advanced technology from abroad,
as well as its manufacture on an increasing scale
within China, testifies to this aim. It is also
obvious that redistribution of income has been a
major aim and a partial achievement of the
People's Republic of China since its foundation
in 1949, along with the related aims of full em-
ployment and a more equitable distribution of
investment and resources. But the specific features
of economic growth in China over the past
quarter of a century, and of the redistributive
policies which have been adopted, are only partly
a reflection of material opportunities and con-
straints. Limitations on growth and redistribu-
tion are also influenced by other considerations.
The overall context, which I shall briefly sketch
in this paper, is set by the wider vision of Maoist
political economy with its particular and explicit
attention, at least since the late 1950s, to the task
of completing the socialist transformation of
Chinese society.
The development of China's socialist economy
interests, often fascinates, a great number of
people other than the China experts themselves.
Yet the impression exists that this is an impene-
trable subject once one has got past the stage of
making favourable generalizations. The progress
made by China since the Liberation of 1949 is
evident; so is the degree of social equity in her
system, but how much further can one go? Those
who want hard statistics will be frustrated by the
scarcity of them since the late 1950s; those who
want to conduct field studies or help write
national plans will certainly not find the Chinese
at all anxious to solicit the aid of Western devel-
opment experts. Details of the plans which the
Chinese have themselves written since the Great
Leap are also very sparse.
A more fundamental problem, especially for
students, is the lack of serious writing in English
on Chinese political economy from an even
remotely Marxist viewpoint. Thus we have a very
imperfect understanding of how the Chipese
themselves define their own tasks of socialist
development. The dissociation of politics and
economics has been carried even further than
usual in the China Watching profession. The
political scientists have been mainly concerned
with 'stability' in China, and the economists with
its 'performance'. The one book-length exception
in English. (Wheelwright and MacFarlaae, The
Chinese Road to Socialism, Monthly Review
Press, New York 1970) and the writings of Charles
Betteiheim and his associates in French (e.g.
Betteiheim, Charrière, Marchisio, La construction
du socialisme en Chine, Maspero, Paris, 1965)
rarely appear on reading lists.
Some of the blocks to our understanding are
beginning to dissolve as more people visit China
and obtain a more detailed grasp of what the
Chinese are trying to do, and why. There are
difficulties. Chinese officials are often reluctant to
discuss processes (e.g. state planning or pur-
chasing) which extend beyond their direct sphere
of responsibility, though they are usually very
informative about everything which occurs at
their own level (e.g. the accounts of a factory, the
distribution system in a commune). Another
difficultyoften more seriousis the visitor's own
lack of prior knowledge which makes his ques-
tions appear bizarre if not meaningless, as well
as posing additional problems for the Chinese
interpreter. Nevertheless a vast amount of infor-
mation is brought back by visitors and needs to
be collated and fully appreciated.
New insights into China's development strategy
may also be gleaned from two further important
sources in the recent past, and it is these to which
I wish to draw attention in this short article. One
source of great interest is a previously unpublished
collection of speeches and writings by Mao Tse-
tung which includes a number of extended dis-
cussions on questioñs of political economy. This
is often referred to as the Wan-sui or Long Life
(to Chairman Mao) collection (bibliographical
details are given below). A second and even more
recent source of new insight is the documents of
the Fourth National People's Congress which was
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held in January .1975 and the discussion in the
Chinese press which accompanied them. The
documents include some rare indications of
Chinese long-range planning for at least the next
decade, while the post-Congress discussion (which
Mao has personally inspired) has revived a whole
range of questions about how to advance along
the 'socialist road'. These questions, which have
been argued about for the last 20 years, are
basic to the Chinese view of their economic
developmentand should be just as basic to our
own efforts to understand it.
Mao on Political Economy
The Wan-sui collection was compiled in Peking
for restricted circulation during the Cultural
Revolution in an edition which later (1973) turned
up in Taiwan. The main purpose of its anony-
mous compilersapart from the obvious one of
bringing up to date the officially published
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (which stop
at the Liberation of 1949)was apparently to
demonstrate to the Chinese reader the essential
continuity of Mao's 'general line' on economic
development. The volume contains a miscellany
of essays, speeches, summaries and notes ranging
from discussions on philosophy, health and
education to conversations with foreign visitors
and Red Guards, but the bulk of the material,
dating from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, is
concerned with economic policies (particularly the
Great Leap Forward) and above all with the
question of China's transition through the
socialist stage of development.1
Many of the Wan-sui documents cover ground
already familiar, at least in outline, although
adding much-needed detail and definition and
doing so in Mao's inimitably lively and allusive
style. But a broader theme comes through which
could only be traced previously with some diffi-
culty from the official record. What the documents
reveal, explicitly and with a wealth of intellec-
tually stimulating analysis, is Mao's constant
preoccupation with charting the course of China's
socialist transition in the light of the Soviet (and
especially Stalinist) experience. Stalin's failure
1 There are actually two volumes, both with the same title of
Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long Live Mao Tse-tung's
Thought) which were published in Peking in 1967 and 1969
respectively. The earlier volume deals mostly with the Great
Leap; the 1969 collection covers the years 1955-68 (pIus a
very few earlier items). Together they offer some 800 pages
of unduplicated Chinese texts and there is some overlapping.
A fairly full selection, including all the items discussed here,
has been translated in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought(1949-68), pts. 1 & 2, issued in Fèbruary 1974 by the joint
Publications Research Service (Arlington, Virginia, JPRS-
61269-1 & 2). Mao's Notes (see below) on political economy
have also been translated by Hu Chi-hsi, Mao Tse-toung et la
construction du socialisme (Paris: Seuil, 1975). No-one has
seriously challenged the authenticity of the documents and the
overwhelming evidence in their favour is discussed in a
useful review by Stuart R. Schram in the China Quarterly,
No. 57.
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to grasp the persistent nature of contradictions
within socialist society, his oppressive handling of
internal dissent and his mistreatment of the Soviet
peasantry, are frankly discussed by Mao. What-
ever the Chinese may say publicly, Mao makes it
clear that the deformation of socialism by Stalin's
successors arose from Stalin's own failure to
solve the problems of the socialist transition. And
it is this object lesson which adds force to Mao's
own efforts, from the mid-l950s onwards, to find
an alternative Chinese road.
Specifically, how can the level of collective
ownership in the countryside be raised until the
contradiction between agriculture and state-
owned industry and town and country generally
has been overcome? What degree of rural pro-
duction, accumulation and distribution must be
reached to enable it to be raised? How can in-
dustry be run on more democratic and innovative
lines? These and other equally important ques-
tions about planning, management, mechanization,
prices, commodity production etc. are discussed
by Mao with a greater realization, as the lessons
of the Great Leap sink in, that there are no easy
answers, but always with the conviction that a
measure of forward movement in the 'transition'
must be maintained. (This continues to be Mao's
main preoccupation in 1975,)
For the non-China specialist the most exciting
document, and also the longest, is a set of notes
written by Mao in 1959-60 as a commentary
upon the Soviet textbook Political Economy. This
was the famous book on which work had pain-
fully begun during Stalin's final years and which
prompted his essay on Economic Problems of
Socialism in the USSR (1952). It was published
after his death, and the third edition (1959) was
translated into Chinese and used by Mao. Both
the textbook and Mao's Notes were studied
throughout China by the Communist Party cadres
in the aftermath of the Great Leap. The Notes
take up 80 pages of Chinese text and are divided
into 75 sections which either provide some sort
of resolution to a particular problem orequally
oftenpoint out the unresolved questions which
it raises. The mood is confident but enquiring and
sometimes tentative. When confronted with
economic realities, Mao writes, "the thoughts of
Marxism-Leninism are confusing" and he ac-
knowledges that the Chinese still have a lot to
learn.
These Notes are the nearest thing we have to a
comprehensive Chinese textbook on political
economy, and certain principles emerge very
clearly. These include insistence on the following
points:
(j) First and foremost, the socialist transition
cannot mark time too long without running the
risk of retrogression. To complete the transition is
China's major task.
The contradiction between the collective
sector (mainly agriculture) and the state-owned
sector (mainly industry) is the most dangerous
and weakest point during the transition. Stalin
failed to recognize, far less to solve, this contra-
diction.
The law of value and prices still have a
definite role under socialism, although not at the
expense of planning.
The purpose of planning itself is not to
produce a 'balanced' economy, but to mediate
between the 'imbalances' which provide the
motive force for further development. Planning
should not be at the expense of local initiative
and 'self-reliant' development.
(y) Electricity is important, but 'politics in com-
mand' is equally so. Thus another failing of
Stalin was that he concentrated on the economic
base and ignored the super-structure (see below).
Ownership is not everything. How distribution
is handled and how individual producers relate
to one another within the collective or state-
owned unit are equally important factors in the
socialist relations of production.
Though the relations of production should
not go too far beyond what the existing level of
productive forces justifies, they should lead the
way and certainly never lag behind.
Apart from the Notes on political economy, the
Wan-sui collection has further riches to offer. It
includes a speech by Mao and a shorter set of
notes, both of which provide a detailed critique
of Stalin's 1952 essay on Economic Problems.
There is also a talk by Mao, dated June 1964,
on the principles behind the Third Five-Year
Plan.
In several other documents Mao discusses the
connection between China's isolation on the inter-
national scene and the need for accelerated
economic development. 'Catching up' with the
West is necessary not only to improve the material
well-being of the Chinese people but to preserve
the Chinese state from being continually looked
down uponand threatenedby imperialism.
(See chapter 11 of my The World and China
1922-72, Eyre-Methuen, London, 1974, for further
analysis of the connection between foreign policy
and economic goals in China.) There are also
numerous passages where Mao discusses various
aspects of economic organization in the country-
side from the Agricultural Co-operative move-
ment of 1955 onwards, though here the ground
has been covered in other documents already
available to us (see the analysis by Jack Gray in
Nuti and Nove, eds., Socialist Economics, Pen-
guin, Harmondsworth, 1972).
Although the Wan-sui collection is dated by now,
and new documents addressing themselves to
current issues continue to be published for
internal circulation only, we do know that the
main themes referred to above are still regarded
as very relevant. Mao's speech on the Stalin essay,
for example, was being studied by cadres all over
China in 1973 (private informatictn). A foreign
visitor to Peking in 1972 was briefed on Chinese
planning policy in terms which reproduced almost
verbatim the essentials of Mao's June 1964 speech
on the subject (Alberto Jacoviello, L'Hypothèse
Chinoise, Seuil, Paris, 1974). The latest popular
book on political economy to be published in
China reflects the main lines of argument in
Mao's Notes on the Soviet textbook (Zhengzhi
jinghi xue jichu zhishi, Shanghai, 1974, 2 vols.
Incidentally this book was first published in an
edition of 450,0000 copies in a series intended
for readership by high school graduatesanother
sign of the seriousness with which the Chinese
treat the subject). So do recent (Jan.-Feb. 1975)
editorials on the future of socialism in China,
published in the official Party journals Red Flag
and People's Daily.
Two brief extracts from the wealth which Mao
offers in the Wan-sul documents may convey
some idea of their potential interest. First, in
chapter 25 of his Notes, Mao discusses the pro-
blem of vested interests appearing under social-
ism, and pinpoints one particular interest group
which could hinder the transition in the country-
side:
"The 'ealization of ownership by the basic
commune should in general benefit everyone,
so we reckon that there will be no conflict with
the vast majority of commune members. But
when that time comes, the original team cadres
will no longer be masters in their own house
(run their own villages), and their administrative
power must necessarily be reduced. Are they
not going to put up some resistance to the
change?
Although a socialist society has abolished
classes, in the course of its development it will
probably have problems with 'vested interests'.
They will rest content with an established
system and be unwilling to have it changed.
For instance they thrive upon the system of
'To each according to his work', under which
the more they work the more they receive, and
they are going to feel unhappy when this is
changed to 'To each according to his need'."
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The second extract comes from Mao's speech in
November 1958 discussing Stalin's essay On
Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR:
"Stalin only talked about the relations of pro-
duction but not about the superstructure, nor
about the relationship between the superstruc-
ture and the economic base. When cadres in
China do labour, and workers take part in
management, and cadres go down to the
countryside to be tempered, and old codes and
conventions are broken, these all belong to the
superstructure and the realm of ideology. Stalin
only talked about the economy, not about
politics, and although there was supposed to
be 'selfless labour', in fact no one did an hour's
more work, and no one could forget himself."
The National People's Congress
The Fourth National People's Congress was held
in January 1975, ten years after the Third Con-
gress and nearly five years overdue. It indicated
general agreement (which seemed to have been
lacking since the Cultural Revolution) on the
priorities for Chinese development. It combined
a strong emphasis upon the need for economic
advance with an equally strong insistence that the
socialist system should be strengthened in this
process. The Congresswhich corresponds to
China's supreme parliamentary bodyalso elected
a capable team of a dozen Deputy Premiers of
the State Council under Premier Chou En-lai,
over half of whom have direct experience as
planners or as producers (they include one
peasant leader and two workers).
In his Report to the Congress, Premier Chou
described a two-stage economic plan which
although already in existence, had not previously
been discussed in public. He also announced that
a new Ten Year Plan is being drawn up for the
next decade. The long-range economic plan began
in 1965 and is supposed to run up to the year
2000. Its first stage (1965-80) is intended "to build
an independent and relatively comprehensive
industrial and economic system"; the second stage
(1981-2000) will accomplish "the comprehensive
modernization of agriculture, industry, national
defence and science and technology". In simpler
language the goal seems to be to establish by 1980
(though the first stage may be running behind
schedule) an economic platform which will then
provide the basis for a concerted drive for
modernization. The weak points which have to be
filled in selectively during the first stage, before
an all-round advance can be made, are still located
mainly in agriculture and agriculture-related
industries such as fertilizers where efforts are
currently being concentrated. The new Ten Year
Plan will bridge the end of Stage One and the
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beginning of Stage Two, according to Premier
Chou. (If, as seems likely, Stage One has been
delayed as a result of the planning hiatus caused
by the Cultural Revolution, then this Ten Year
Plan will see it through to completion). Frag-
mentary as this discussion of China's long-range
planning may be, it still adds considerably to our
knowledge hitherto and should provide a frame-
work into which further information may be
fitted.
Two other themes which were discussed at the
time of the Congress are also of considerable
interest, for the light which they throw upon those
aspects of the socialist relations of production
which the Chinese regard as particularly critical
at the present time. They also vividly illustrate
the integration of political and economic goals
by the Chinese in a way which makes the familiar
China Watching distinction between supposed
'moderates' and 'radicals' in Peking one of very
limited value. The problems in question are those
of (j) industrial democracy, and (ii) socialism
in the countryside.
(i) Industrial relations: The new Chinese Consti-
tution which was approved by the National
People's Congress, includes the 'right to strike'
among the basic liberties which the Chinese
people enjoy. This provision, which was inserted
in the draft of the Constitution at Mao Tse-tung's
personal request, reflects a long-standing pre-
occupation with the content more than the form
oC industrial relations on Mao's part. In terms of
ownership the industrial sector is naturally more
advanced than the agricultural sector, since most
industry is state-owned. But Mao has long been
wary of the too-easily-drawn equation between
ownership 'by the state' and 'by the people'.
In his Notes on Political Economy written in
1960, Mao described the question of management
as the most important problem after that of
ownership had been solved. There must be a limit,
he wrote, to the progressive change of ownership
within a given period, but "in the same time it
is possible for the relationship between indi-
viduals in the midst of production or labour
to reform without interruption". He drew atten-
tion to the following measures which had been
adopted in state enterprises in order to surmount
the divide between worker and management:
combining centralized leadership with mass
movements;
leadership by the Party;
integration of workers and technicians;
participation of cadres in manual labour;
participation of workers in management;
continuous change of unreasonable codes and
conventions.
"If the cadres do not discard their haughty airs",
he commented elsewhere in the Notes, "and
identify themselves with the workers, then the
workers will frequently look upon the factory
not as their own but as the cadres' ". One should
not assume that, under the socialist system,
workers and cadres would develop a co-operative
relationship "without any political work being
done".
Fifteen years after Mao wrote his Notes, this
problem still causes acute concern to the Chinese.
The Cultural Revolution encouraged more grass-
roots assertiveness by the organized workers, and
after a lull this revived in 1974 during the Anti-
Confucius campaign, when a number of strikes
(especially on the railways and in the coal indus-
try) caused some worrying losses of production.
Significantly the reaction of the National People's
Congress has been not to condemn this form of
activity but to acknowledge the defects in the
system which help to provoke it. In his report on
the new Constitution to the National People's
Congress, Vice-Premier Chang Chun-chiao had
this to say (echoing as he did so Mao's original
argument):
"Like the morning sun, our socialist system is
still very young. It was born in struggle and can
only grow in struggle. Take the State sector
of the economy for example. In some enter-
prises, the form is that of socialist ownership,
but the reality is that their leadership is not
in the hands of Marxists and the masses of
workers."
Workers are naturally not supposed to resort to
strike action without seeking to remedy their
grievances in other ways (e.g. by putting up
posters or by complaint to higher authorities,
both actions being provided for in the new Con-
stitution). It is also explained that one is entitled
to "strike for socialism and not for capitalism"-
that is, strikes for greater financial rewards will
be criticized. Nevertheless the formal provision in
the Constitution of the right to strike is unusual
among the socialist countries and unusual too in
the frankness with which the underlying problem
is acknowledged.
(ii) Socialism in the countryside: The new state
Constitution also provides several important
definitions of the existing state of social owner-
ship in China. Generally speaking there are two
kinds of ownership of the means of production
at the present stage. These consist of socialist
ownership by the whole people, and socialist
collective ownership by working people (Article
5). The first of these corresponds to the State
sector of industry, although quite a large number
of smaller enterprises are still collectively owned.
The second category, apart from such enterprises,
is entirely located in the countryside where col-
lectivization is the rule except for a small number
of State farms (occupying probably not more
than 4 per cent of China's cultivated land).
Article 7 of the Constitution proceeds to define
the critical area of ownership in the countryside
in more detail: this should "generally take the
form of three-level ownership, that is, ownership
by the commune, the production brigade and the
production team, with the last as the basic
accounting unit". This formula confirms the
current situation, where some resources (e.g. rural
industry, hydroelectric works, etc.) are owned
collectively by the commune, others by the
brigade, while in the majority of cases the owner-
ship and control of land and the basic means of
production, and the disposition of the proceeds
of production is in the hands of the 'production
team'the lowest level of organization which
usually corresponds to a simple village. The same
article of the constitution also sanctions the
'private plot' where commune members may farm
or keep livestock for their personal needs.
This article of the Constitution also allows for
'non-agricultural individual labourers'. These
would include the producers of cottage handi-
crafts, a few pedlars, handymen, barbers, etc.,
who are licensed to operate independently by the
urban street committee or by the rural production
team.
It might appear that the Constitution has 'fixed'
the status quo in rural collective ownership (and
some China Watchers have described this as a
'victory for the moderates'). In fact this is not
the Chinese way of looking at the problem, and
it is directly contradicted by accompanying state-
ments in the official press. It is true that the
overall framework has been fixed. This has been
done partly in reaction against what have been
described as 'ultra-Leftist' attempts to leapfrog
the socialist stage by, for example, abolishing
private plots indiscriminately. Such efforts to
arouse the 'wind of communism' before the
season is ripe for it, date back to the Great Leap
Forward, and re-appeared towards the end of the
Cultural Revolution in 1969-70.
But if 'leaping forward' is disapproved of, so is
'marking time'. Coinciding with the National
People's Congress, a massive campaign for agri-
cultural capital improvement has been launched
both to raise rural productivity andequally
importantto prepare the ground for raising the
level of collective ownership. In this way, forward
movement within the framework provided for by
the Constitútion is encouraged, although it is
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still expected to cover a considerable length of
time.
The strategy has been explained in, for example,
an editorial from the daily newspaper of Hunan
province (23 December 1974):
"To actively develop the commune and brigade
enterprises, expand the accumulation of the
commune and brigade, purchase large farm
machinery which the production teams have
no means to purchase themselves, build farm-
land and water conservancy projects which
they also cannot manage by themselves, and
help the poorer production teams to develop
productionthese are currently the urgent
requirements for the development of produc-
tion. Speaking in the long term, ownership in
the people's communes always advances from
ownership by the small collective to ownership
by the big collective and then to ownership
by the whole people . . . . How can anyone
say that it does not matter much?"
Thus the political goal of continuing China's for-
ward motion along the transitional road of social-
ism (raising the level of ownership) is explicitly
linked with one of the economic priorities of the
current national plan (the campaign for 'agricul-
tural construction'). 'Cheap' labour is employed
by the larger collective unitthe commune or
brigadein the slack farming season to improve
land, build roads, new irrigation works, small-
scale industries etc. The labour is 'cheap' because
the peasants are only paid at rates equivalent to
the value of labour points in their own production
teams, and therefore the poorer teams contribute
their labourof which in any case they are likely
to have a larger surplus than the better-off teams
at lower rates. This will lead in time to the
enlargement of the commune- or brigade-owned
collective sector as well as to new assets which,
shared generally by the production teams, will also
tend to increase their own productivity and
income. In the course of this process a stronger
material base is created which will eventually
allow the level of ownership to be raised, Of
course all sorts of difficulties can occur along the
way, and the Chinese press and radio provide
examples in plentyparticularly of the reluctance
of the better-off small collective to invest its
labour in the larger collective. But the overall
strategy and objectives are clear enough.
On a much broader theoretical front, the National
People's Congress has been followed by what
turns out to be the most comprehensive definition
of the 'socialist transition', and of the problems
which attend it, to be made publicly in China
since the Great leap Forward. The equivocal
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nature of a society whose economic forces and
socialist institutions are still relatively undevel-
oped has been stressed, with supporting quo-
tations from Maosome of which echo the still
unpublished (in China) Wan-sui documents.
Specific areas of contradiction have been identi-
fied, including the following:
(j) The system of unequal remuneration, especial-
ly in Chinese industry, where the pursuit of
material incentives could lead in time to the birth
of a new proletarian bourgeoisie. "Even now
China practises an eight-grade wage system", Mao
has said ......distribution to each according to
his work and exchange by means of money,
which are scarcely different from those in the old
society." (The argument applies as much to the
work-point system in the countryside, but it is
made with particular force in relation to urban
wage earnerswhich include technicians and
cadres, each with their separate wage scale, as
well as workers on the eight-grade system).
The continuing danger of 'capitalist' attitudes
and relations in the countryside being revived as
long as production and collective ownership are
on a relatively small scale. The People's Daily
(9 February 1975) has argued (quoting Lenin)
that ". . . . until socialist collective ownership is
changed into ownership by the whole people
and until the remnants of private economy are
eliminated, peasants will inevitably maintain some
small-producer characteristics. There inevitably
exist spontaneous capitalist tendencies among
some well-to-do peasants".
The tendency, not wholly eliminated by the
Cultural Revolution, for Party and State officials
to dispense with democratic management in the
running of offices or enterprises, and to seek
privileges for themselves or for their units. There
were frequent complaints in 1973-74 of, for
example, the children of cadres entering college
'by the back door' with parental assistance. Vari-
ous forms of bonus incentives had also been
re-introduced in a number of Chinese industries.
After the National People's Congress, attention
upon these sorts of shortcomings became still
more sharply focused with the publication of two
strongly worded articles, in the Communist Partyjournal Red Flag, by the two most prominent
radical members of the Party Politburo, Yao
Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao (see biblio-
graphy below).
Conclusion
The Chinese view of political economy which has
been discussed here provides a frame of reference
within which it is fair to assume that most
Chinese leaders have approached the tasks of
development over the past two decades. The links
between political and economic change are expli-
cit and generally recognized; it is unlikely that
by now anything resembling what used to be
called the 'purely economic viewpoint' still sur-
vives. Just because these links have, to a large
extent, been ignored in most Western literature on
the subject, it is all the more important to stress
them and to take a unified view of Chinese
advances on both political and economic fronts.
At the same time it would be foolish to ignore
the very sharp arguments which have arisen at
intervals over the past two decades since the
Chinese (and Mao in particular) first began to
query the more limited definition of the building
of socialismheavy industry plus common
ownershipwhich they had acquired from the
Soviet Union.
It is the various controversies between the groups
in the Chinese leadership described by outside
observers as 'radical' and 'moderate' which
usually attract attention in the West, rather than
the common assumptions that underlie the debate
in China. The Chinese themselves have developed
a tendency to emphasizeperhaps over-emphasize
the element of conflict ('class struggle') in an
argument which has at times clearly become en-
tangled with issues of factional politics. What
should not be in doubt is the shared commitment
to completing the task of the 'transition to social-
isni', in spite of these controversies over the
means and the place of implementation, nor
should this be blotted out by the echoes of fac-
tional struggle too oftei magnified beyond their
proper volume by Western China Watching
techniques. Neither can there be any doubt about
the essential realism of the Chinese approach:
the attainment of the socialist goal has been seen
by all concerned, ever since the Great Leap
Forward offered an illusory short-cut, as a com-
plex and long-term process for which many of the
answers are still lacking.
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